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Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison




In this paper, I analyze an example in which two perfectly informed experts advise a decision
maker. Each expert has private information about her own bias. I show that consulting two experts
is better than consulting just one. I compare the efficiency of information transmission between
simultaneous, sequential, and hierarchical forms of communication. I show that simultaneous
communication achieves the highest efficiency, followed by sequential and hierarchical communi-
cation. However, hierarchical communication, in which a second expert chooses whether to block
the first expert’s message, achieves a moderate level of efficiency, even though the decision maker
receives only one message. Finally, there are preference settings in which both sequential and
hierarchical communication are superior to simultaneous communication.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Decision makers such as politicians, CEO , and investors often rely on experts such
as advisors, managers, and analysts, respectively, for advice. However, experts of-
ten have biases, as a result of conflicts of interest or matters of ideology. A common
method that is believed to have the potential to alleviate the problem is to seek sec-
ond opinions, which conceivably enables the decision makers to acquire a more
complete understanding of the issues.
However, new difficulties arise when there are multiple experts, and hence
multiple reports. Strategic interactions between experts become more complex–
they may strengthen, rebut, and fine-tune each other’s reports. It takes the decision
maker extra time and energy to digest all the reports and to extract useful informa-
tion from them. Furthermore, the decision maker is often an outsider to the experts’
profession or group, and therefore is not informed about the preferences of the ex-
perts. Thus, it is important to find the kind of communication mechanisms with
which the decision maker can achieve information transmission efficiency.
In this paper, I build a model of communication where two perfectly in-
formed experts advise a single decision maker, based on the model of Crawford
and Sobel (1982), with the feature that experts have private information about their
own preferences. Using a symmetric example, I compare the decision maker’s ex-
pected payoff under different communication mechanisms. In keeping with the
convention applied in the literature, the reported opinions of experts are referred to
as “messages.”
The decision maker has the option to ask just one expert or to ignore the
message from one of the experts. When he chooses to take advantage of both ex-
perts, he has various options.1 The first option is to consult experts simultaneously,
where neither expert observes the message sent by the other. The second option
is to consult them sequentially, where the second expert observes the first expert’s
message before sending her own. I refer to these two mechanisms as direct com-
munication mechanisms since the decision maker hears both experts’ messages.
In addition, I consider another option referred to as hierarchical communication,
where one of the experts acts as a reviewer of the other expert’s message and de-
cides whether or not to pass it on. If she accepts the expert’s message, then the
decision maker hears the original message. If she rejects it, however, the decision
maker receives a random message drawn from the distribution that is endogenously
generated by interactions between the reviewer and the expert, which is to be elab-
orated upon later.
1For ease of discussion, I refer to the decision maker as “he,” and each expert “she.”
s
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Note that, when using the hierarchical communication mechanism, the deci-
sion maker only receives one final message, as opposed to receiving two messages
when using the direct communication mechanisms. In a sense, he delegates part
of the task of information solicitation to the reviewer. This mechanism may be
preferred by a decision maker who favours a simple mechanism. The hierarchi-
cal communication mechanism is of interest as it captures some of the features of
many communication and organization structures in reality. For example, in cor-
porations, lower-level employees make reports to the mid-level management, and
what the higher-level executives receive is a selective pool of reports that are filtered
by mid-level management.
I focus on symmetric equilibrium outcomes in these mechanisms and com-
pare their communication efficiency. Consulting two experts is better than consult-
ing just one. In the main example I consider, simultaneous communication fares
the best among the two-expert mechanisms. Sequential communication allows for
equilibria that are better than with hierarchical communication, but it also allows
equilibria that are worse. In hierarchical communication, the reviewer serves as
deterrence and safeguard against distortions by the biased expert. If rejection is
carried out in equilibrium, however, then its performance is inferior relative to the
direct consultation mechanisms.
However, the welfare comparisons may vary with the magnitude of the ex-
perts’ biases. In particular, there exist values of the biases for which both sequential
communication and hierarchical communication perform better than simultaneous
communication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the com-
munication mechanisms and the equilibrium concept. Section 3 characterizes the
most informative equilibria of the mechanisms. Section 4 compares welfare under
the three different mechanisms. Section 5 discusses the results and the relation-
ship that this paper has with the literature. Proofs are found in the appendix unless
otherwise noted.
2 THE MODEL
Two experts advise a decision maker, who takes an action from the set Y = [−1,1].
The decision maker wants his action to match an underlying state, randomly drawn
from the set S = {−1,0,1}, according to the uniform distribution. The decision
maker does not know the state, but the experts do. In addition, each expert’s bias is
her private information. There are three possible types of experts that can be drawn
from the set X = {−1,0,1}, each with probability 1/3. The state and both experts’
biases are independent of one another. Both the experts and the decision maker
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have quadratic-loss utility functions:
u(y,s, b˜) =−[y− (s+ b˜)]2, (1)
where y is the action taken by the decision maker, s is the true state, and b˜ is the
bias of the agent. For the decision maker b˜ = 0, and for an expert of type x ∈ X ,
b˜ = bx, where
bx = bx.
The following assumption restricts the range of values for b.
Assumption 1. The bias value b lies in [17/21,6/7].
This assumption ensures the validity of equilibrium construction for hierar-
chical communication in Section 3. The results may vary when b takes other values.
First, there exists a fully revealing equilibrium for all communication mechanisms
above when b≤ 1/2. The comparisons between different mechanisms may change
when b is outside the range of values stated in Assumption 1. Section 4 conducts
a further discussion of this point. Finally, the limitation to three messages below
affects the equilibrium outcomes when b is relatively small, as without this limit
there could exist equilibria where more than three messages are sent.
Each expert is allowed to send a message from a message space M. For the
sake of tractability, I limit M to be S = {−1,0,1}.2 The decision maker asks for
advice from experts. He may choose to ask just one expert. If the decision maker
asks both experts, he may choose among various mechanisms. In this paper, I
consider the following three mechanisms: simultaneous communication, sequential
communication, and hierarchical communication.
With the simultaneous communication mechanism, the decision maker chooses
his action after hearing simultaneous messages from the two experts. Each expert is
allowed to send a message from the message space M. In order to ensure clarity of
notation, I label the experts A and B. Expert i’s message is denoted as mi, i = A,B.
I define the strategy of expert i of type x as mix : S→M, for i = A,B and x ∈ X . In
other words, mix(s) is what expert i of type x would send if the state is s ∈ S. The
2This is not without loss of generality. There are scenarios in which allowing additional mes-
sages may improve communication between the experts and the decision maker. However, even in
richer environments than that in this model, experts are sometimes limited to relatively small mes-
sage spaces due either to conventions or to the decision maker’s information processing constraints.
For example, stock analysts overwhelmingly adopt the categorized ranking system, presumably to
make their recommendations easier to comprehend for investors. Since the restriction applies to
all mechanisms, I put all the mechanisms on a “level playing field.” Notably, Austen-Smith (1993)
and Morris (2001) also consider models with discrete spaces and restrict the message space to be
the same as the state space.
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decision maker’s strategy is defined as y : M×M→ [−1,1], where y(mA,mB) is the
action taken by the decision maker when he receives the message pair (mA,mB).
With the sequential communication mechanism, expert A sends a message,
expert B observes it and sends another message, and finally the decision maker
hears both messages and chooses his action. With a slight abuse of notation (since
mBx has already been used above as a function with a single argument), their strate-
gies can be defined respectively as mAx : S→M, and mBx : S×M→M. For A, mAx (s)
is the message sent by an expert of type x when the true state is s; for B, mBx (s, t)
is the message sent by an expert of type x when the true state is s and expert A has
reported t. The decision maker’s strategy is y : M×M→ [−1,1], where y(mA,mB)
represents the action taken when the message pair is (mA,mB).
With the hierarchical communication mechanism, expert A sends a message
about the underlying state, but her message must pass through a reviewer (expert
B) before reaching the decision maker. The reviewer may either reject the message
or accept it. When she rejects it, the decision maker receives a random message
coming from the endogenous distribution of messages generated by interactions
between the experts. Without knowing whether the message he receives is an orig-
inal message or a random one following a rejection, the decision maker takes his
action based solely upon the message.
The random distribution of messages can be interpreted as being generated
by a population of decision makers and experts facing identical uncertain situations.
Furthermore, this mechanism is somewhat similar in spirit to mechanisms involving
“veto power” in the cheap-talk literature.3 The results in these models typically
depend on the exogenously determined status quo when the decision maker vetoes
the expert’s recommendation. Here, in the hierarchical communication mechanism,
the random distribution can be viewed as an endogenously generated status quo.
Let Γ = (γ−1,γ0,γ1) be the random distribution of messages eventually re-
ceived by the decision maker, where γm is the probability of message m ∈M. Let
the expert’s strategy be mx : S→M, where mx(s) is the message sent by an expert
of type x∈ X when the state is s. In addition, let m˜x(s, t) = 1{mx(s) = t}. Let the re-
viewer’s strategy be rv : S×M→{0,1} , where rv(s, t) = 1 indicates that a reviewer
of type v rejects message t when the state is s and rv(s, t) = 0 indicates that she
accepts the message. The decision maker’s strategy is defined as y : M→ [−1,1].
For the sake of convenience, I use ym to refer to the action taken by the decision
maker after hearing message m ∈M.
3See Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), Krishna and Morgan (2001a), Dessein (2002), Mylovanov
(2008), and Board and Dragu (2006).
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EQUILIBRIUM
For the sake of tractability, I consider only pure strategy equilibria.4 I adopt the
solution concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For the direct communication
mechanisms, this means that each expert sends a message that maximizes her ex-
pected utility and the decision maker chooses the optimal action given his Bayesian
beliefs. For the hierarchical communication mechanism, this additionally requires
that the reviewer’s decision of rejection or acceptance is optimal and that the dis-
tribution of messages resulting from play is the same as the distribution where the
random message is drawn when there is a rejection. The last requirement can be
written
γt = ∑s∈S Ps∑x∈X Pxm˜x(s, t)∑v∈X Pv[1− rv(s, t)]
+∑s∈S Ps∑x∈X Px∑t ′∈M m˜x(s, t ′)∑v∈X Pvrv(s, t ′) · γt ,
where Ps, Px, and Pv stand for the probabilities of state s, type x expert, and type v
reviewer occurring respectively. They are all equal to 1/3 in this model.
As in all cheap-talk models, two issues arise. The first is the meaning of
messages. I make the following assumption to reduce essentially identical equilib-
ria into one. The idea is that a high message is more likely to indicate a higher state
than a low message. A right-biased expert is more likely to send a right-biased mes-
sage than other types of experts. An expert is more likely to report a state to be high
when it is indeed high. This assumption does not pose additional restrictions for si-
multaneous communication and hierarchical communication. However, it does for
sequential communication, although I am not aware of any non-monotonic equilib-
rium informationally superior to monotonic ones.5
Assumption 2. (Monotonicity.) The decision maker’s strategy must be nondecreas-
ing in the message(s) he receives. The experts’ messages must be nondecreasing in
the state and their biases.
The second issue that arises is multiplicity of equilibria. In particular, a
babbling equilibrium always exists. Following previous work in which the cheap-
talk model is applied, I will focus on the most informative among all symmetric
equilibria.6
4This is without loss of generality for a single expert and expert B in the sequential mechanism,
as b is less than one, which precludes mixing by any expert. However, equilibria in mixed strategies
my exist for other mechanisms.
5Notably, there also exist “partisan bickering equilibria” in which monotonicity is violated and in
which the decision maker does even worse than in the single-expert case. See Li (2008) for details.
6Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008) provide an equilibrium selection criterion that justifies the focus
on the most informative equilibrium in Crawford and Sobel’s model with complete information
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Definition 1. A pure strategy profile (mˆ,(rˆ), yˆ) is a mirror image of another strategy
profile (m,(r),y) if for all i=A,B, x,v∈X , s, t ∈ S, and m∈ S or S×S, the following
conditions are satisfied where they apply:
(SE1) simultaneous communication: mix(s) =−mˆi−x(−s);
sequential communication: mAx (s) =−mˆA−x(−s);
hierarchical communication or consulting one expert: mx(s) =−mˆ−x(−s).
(SE2) sequential communication: mBx (s, t) =−mˆB−x(−s,−t);
hierarchical communication: rv(s, t) = rˆ−v(−s,−t).
(SE3) yˆ(m) =−y(−m).
(SE4) hierarchical communication: γt = γˆ−t for all t ∈M.
Definition 2. An equilibrium is symmetric if and only if the equilibrium strategy
profile is a mirror image of itself.
Intuitively, in a symmetric equilibrium experts and reviewers of type 1 and
−1 behave in a similar way, and state values −1 and 1 and messages −1 and 1 are
treated in a similar way. Consequently, when I characterize symmetric equilibria, I
need only consider the behaviour of experts (and reviewers) of types 0 and 1.
Before characterizing the equilibria, note that full revelation is not possible
in equilibrium. This is made clear in the next section. Here, I offer only an infor-
mal argument for the hierarchical communication mechanism, in place of a formal
proof. Due to the quadratic loss utility function, no reviewer would reject the mes-
sage 0, because it would generate a random message symmetrically distributed over
−1, 0, and 1. Thus, a right-biased expert would prefer to report −1 as 0, ruling out
full revelation as an equilibrium outcome.
3 EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, I characterize the most informative equilibrium for each mechanism.
about the expert’s bias, although it remains unclear how their result can be generalized to models
with uncertainty about biases.
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CONSULTING ONE EXPERT
Proposition 1. When the decision maker consults only one expert, the only sym-
metric equilibrium is as follows:
1) m∗0(s) = s, m
∗
1(s) = s+1 if s 6= 1, and m∗1(1) = 1;
2) y∗m = (2/3)m.
In equilibrium, the decision maker’s expected payoff is −10/27.
In equilibrium, biased experts misrepresent the state whenever possible.
That is, an expert of type 1 reports state −1 as 0 and 0 as 1. They are able to
do this as there are no forces to counteract or punish biased messages. In a sense,
this is the worst that could occur to the decision maker in an informative equilib-
rium. Now, I turn to the investigation of whether the introduction of another expert
improves the situation.
SIMULTANEOUS COMMUNICATION
In this mechanism, each expert simultaneously sends a message to the decision
maker. In addition to the symmetry conditions above, another symmetry condition
is added.
Assumption 3. (Anonymity.) mAx (s) = mBx (s) for all x ∈ X and s ∈ S.
The idea behind this condition is that an expert’s messages are not affected
by her labelling, but only by the underlying state and her bias. As a result, in equi-
librium, the decision maker’s action is based only on the combination of message
pairs, but not on the source of messages. The main result is as follows.
Proposition 2. In the simultaneous communication game, strategy profile (A), as
defined in Table 1, is the only pure strategy symmetric equilibrium that satisfies
anonymity. In this equilibrium, the decision maker’s expected payoff is −94/405.
Strategy profile (A) is a “replication” of the equilibrium of the one-expert
case. Here, biased messages are sometimes balanced by the other expert who may
have a different bias. For example, although a right-biased expert still reports state
−1 as 0, her report is offset by the other expert when the other expert’s bias is−1 or
0, which occurs with a probability of 2/3; the decision maker then takes the action
−2/3 after receiving the message pair (0,−1) or (−1,0). On the other hand, in the
one-expert mechanism, he takes action 0 when he receives the message 0, which is
farther away from his most preferred action −1 in state −1. Therefore, compared
7
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Table 1: Strategy Profile (A)
mA,mB Type 0 Type 1
State -1 −1 0
State 0 0 1
State 1 1 1
y mB = 0 mB = 1
mA =−1 −2/3 0
mA = 0 0 2/3
mA = 1 2/3 4/5
Table 2: Strategy Profile (C)
mA Type 0 Type 1
State -1 −1 0
State 0 0 1
State 1 1 1
mB0 m
A =−1 mA = 0 mA = 1
State -1 −1 −1 −1
State 0 1 0 −1
State 1 1 1 1
mB1 m
A =−1 mA = 0 mA = 1
State -1 1 0 −1
State 0 1 1 1
State 1 1 1 1
y mB = 0 mB = 1
mA =−1 −4/5 −1/2
mA = 0 0 2/3
mA = 1 4/5 4/5
to the case with one expert, the improvement in information transmission is due to
the fact that with two experts, the decision maker has a higher chance of getting
undistorted information from one of the experts.
SEQUENTIAL COMMUNICATION
In the sequential communication mechanism, the second expert sends a message
based on what the first expert has reported. The main result can be desccribed as
follows.
Proposition 3. Strategy profiles (C), as defined in Table 2, is the most informa-
tive monotonic symmetric equilibria of the sequential communication game. The
decision maker’s expected payoff is −104/405.
In equilibrium, expert A always distorts her message towards the direction
of her bias, just as she would in the one-expert mechanism. For example, an expert
of type 1 reports−1 as 0 and 0 as 1. Expert B behaves as if she were the first expert
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and distorts her message towards her bias, if expert A has not sent a biased message.
If expert A has done so, then if expert B has the same bias as expert A, she may
further distort it, make a moderate report, or correct the distortion by expert A it
proves to be excessive (for example, reporting −1 as 1). If she is unbiased or if her
bias is the opposite of expert A’s, then she always chooses to offset the distortion
by expert A, if this option is available in equilibrium. For example, an expert B of
type 0 would like to report 1 if expert A has reported state 0 as −1. Compared with
the one-expert mechanism, the improvement in information transmission is due to
the fact that the second expert has a chance to offset the distortion introduced by
the first expert.
HIERARCHICAL COMMUNICATION
In the hierarchical communication mechanism, the reviewer decides whether to re-
ject the expert’s message in favour of a random one, or to pass the message on.
Formally, when the message of an expert is rejected by a reviewer, the reviewer
will draw a message from the endogenous symmetric distribution, (γ,1− 2γ,γ),
where γ ∈ (0,1/2).
Proposition 4. For the hierarchical communication mechanism, strategy profile
(E), as defined in Table 3, is the only symmetric equilibrium of the game (y∗1 = 46/63
and γ = 7/23). The decision maker’s expected payoff is −194/567.
In the above equilibrium, the expert follows what she would do in the one-
expert mechanism. But, if she is biased, her distortion in state 0 is rejected by a re-
viewer with the opposite bias or with no bias. Rejection occurs only in cases where
an unbiased reviewer would also like to reject the message. Since the unbiased re-
viewer has the same preferences as the decision maker, such rejection improves the
payoff of the decision maker. However, the threat of rejection is not sufficient to
deter the biased expert from distorting the state.
4 COMPARISONS
In this section, I discuss the welfare comparisons between the communication mech-
anisms considered above and their robustness to different setups.
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Table 3: Strategy Profile (E)
mA Type 0 Type 1
State -1 −1 0
State 0 0 1
State 1 1 1
r0 m =−1 m = 0 m = 1
State -1 0 0 1
State 0 1 0 1
State 1 1 0 0
r1 m =−1 m = 0 m = 1
State -1 0 0 1
State 0 1 0 0
State 1 1 0 0
RESULTS OF THE COMPARISONS
Table 4 offers a summary both in terms of absolute payoffs and the improvements
from the babbling outcome relative to simultaneous communication. Since von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility is unique up to affine transformations, the
second column accurately reflects the welfare comparisons between different equi-
libria. The first observation is that all two-expert mechanisms do better than the
one-expert mechanism, thus conforming to the idea that second opinions improve
information transmission. The second observation is regarding the ranking of in-
formation efficiency for the two-expert communication mechanisms. Considering
the most informative equilibrium, the ranking is (from the highest to the lowest): 1.
simultaneous communication; 2. sequential communication; 3. hierarchical com-
munication. However, there exist equilibria in sequential communication in which
the decision maker is worse off than he is under hierarchical communication. This
is the case in strategy profile (D) in Table 5, in which the decision maker’s payoff
is −16/45, or 71.6 in the percentage terms of Table 4.
The three mechanisms differ in terms of the way in which the second expert
enhances communication. With simultaneous communication, neither expert can
respond to the other’s specific messages–the two experts send independent mes-
sages and the decision maker aggregates them and forms an assessment. With two
experts, there is a higher likelihood that the decision maker will receive undistorted
information from one of the experts. In contrast, with sequential communication,
the second expert’s message can be tailored to offset or to strengthen the first ex-
pert’s biased message. This is a mixed blessing–though it causes the most efficient
equilibrium in sequential communication to be close to that in simultaneous com-
munication, it also allows equilibria that are not very informative. For example, in
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Table 4: Comparisons of decision maker’s payoff in equilibria–the second column








Table 5: Strategy Profile (D)
mA Type 0 Type 1
State -1 −1 0
State 0 0 1
State 1 1 1
mB0 m
A =−1 mA = 0 mA = 1
State -1 −1 −1 −1
State 0 1 0 −1
State 1 1 1 1
mB1 m
A =−1 mA = 0 mA = 1
State -1 1 0 −1
State 0 1 0∗ 1
State 1 1 0∗ 1
y mB = 0 mB = 1
mA =−1 −4/5 −1/2
mA = 0 0 0
mA = 1 4/5 4/5
strategy profile (D), once the first expert sends the message 0, the second expert has
no possibility to change the decision maker’s inference.7 With hierarchical commu-
nication, communication is enhanced through yet another channel. If the reviewer
rejects a message, a random message is generated, causing all three actions, one of
which least liked by the expert, to occur with a significant probability. Therefore,
the expert may be deterred from sending a biased message by the threat of rejection.
The actual act of rejection when the expert does send a biased message also reduces
the amount of harm inflicted by the biased message. However, if in equilibrium the
threat of rejection is carried out with a positive probability, it results in a loss in the
decision maker’s payoff, which explains the inferior performance of hierarchical
communication relative to the direct communication mechanisms.
In this paper, I model hierarchical communication as a mechanism where in-
teractions between experts are not made transparent to the decision make and only
7See also Li (2008).
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the final message is observable to him. This corresponds to economic situations
in which the decision maker just receives one unified recommendation, instead of
hearing each expert’s opinion and what they think about each other’s opinion. For
example, a political leader would only choose one economic policy proposal, with-
out necessarily knowing how the proposal has been promoted to prominence.
ROBUSTNESS
In the preceding discussion, I have focused on values of the bias that satisfy As-
sumption 1. Equilibrium characterization, as well as comparisons of information
transmission efficiency, may vary when the value of the bias changes. In partic-
ular, when b = 2/3, the comparison between the most informative equilibrium in
each communication mechanism is different from that of Table 4. Here, the ranking
of information transmission efficiency of the three mechanisms becomes (from the
highest to the lowest): 1. sequential communication; 2. hierarchical communica-
tion; 3. simultaneous communication.8 The unique equilibrium for simultaneous
communication is the same as before. However, as demonstrated by the equilibrium
in Table 7, in sequential communication, the smaller magnitude of bias affords the
second expert a better opportunity to fine-tune the first expert’s biased report. For
example, in state 0, if the first expert has a positive bias and sends message 1, the
second expert would send message 0 instead of 1 when she also has positive bias.
Thus, the message pair (1,1) is only sent in state 1. This reduction in the distortion
results in an increase in the decision maker’s payoff. In hierarchical communica-
tion, as demonstrated in Table 8, there now exists an equilibrium in which rejection
deters the biased expert from distorting the state 0. This implies that no rejection
actually takes place in equilibrium, hence no loss of payoffs from such a rejection.
This is the reason why hierarchical communication performs relatively well.
In hierarchical communication, after the rejection of the expert’s message,
a message is drawn from a random distribution. Randomness is a punishment for
an expert who sends a biased message because it results in the expert’s least pre-
ferred action being taken with a positive probability. Such randomness is essential
to the mechanism. If, after rejection, the decision maker receives no message at
all, then he would always take action 0, which is not an effective deterrence. How-
ever, one may let the distribution of the random message be exogenously given,
similar to Blume, Board, and Kawamura (2007), who assume that if the expert’s
message fails to reach the decision maker, the decision maker receives a “noise”
message randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. This alternative setup would
8Similar to the case b ∈ [17/21,6/7], there also exist informative equilibria in sequential com-
munication that are worse than simultaneous and hierarchical communication.
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Table 6: Comparisons of decision maker’s payoff in equilibria for b = 2/3– the
second column is an affine normalization of payoffs such that babbling becomes 0
and sequential communication becomes 100.
Absolute Percentage
Babbling −2/3 0




Table 7: Most informative equilibrium in sequential communication when b = 2/3
mA Type 0 Type 1
State -1 −1 0
State 0 0 1
State 1 1 1
mB0 m
A =−1 mA = 0 mA = 1
State -1 −1 −1 −1
State 0 1 0 −1
State 1 1 1 1
mB1 m
A =−1 mA = 0 mA = 1
State -1 0 0 −1
State 0 1 1 0∗
State 1 1 1 1
y mB = 0 mB = 1
mA =−1 −2/3 0
mA = 0 0 2/3
mA = 1 2/3 1
slightly alter the incentives of the expert and the reviewer, but it would not affect
the qualitative results.
5 DISCUSSION AND RELATED LITERATURE
In this paper, I have analyzed an example of communication in which there are
two experts and a single decision maker. The experts have perfect knowledge of the
state of the world. In addition, they have private information about their own biases.
I have compared information transmission efficiency between three mechanisms:
simultaneous, sequential, and hierarchical communication.
In related work, Austen-Smith (1993) studies communication between two
experts and a decision maker in the context of legislation rules, comparing sequen-
tial communication with simultaneous communication. In his model, the state and
message spaces are binary, and experts are imperfectly informed. He finds that
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Table 8: Equilibrium in hierarchical communication when b = 2/3
mA Type 0 Type 1
State -1 −1 0
State 0 0 0∗
State 1 1 1
r0 m =−1 m = 0 m = 1
State -1 0 0 1
State 0 1 0 1
State 1 1 0 0
r1 m =−1 m = 0 m = 1
State -1 0 0 1
State 0 1 0 0
State 1 1 0 0
sequential communication is superior to simultaneous communication. Also in a
model with a binary state space, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) show that simulta-
neous communication is superior to sequential communication when the prior over
the two states is symmetric, while the opposite may be true when it is not. In
contrast, Krishna and Morgan (2001a,b) show that in the “uniform-quadratic case,”
simultaneous communication allows for the full revelation of information, when
information about experts’ biases is common knowledge (Battaglini (2002) also of-
fers a nice discussion of this result). A similar construction would also work in
my model under common knowledge of biases. Furthermore, Krishna and Mor-
gan (2001b) show that full revelation of information is not possible when using
sequential communication if both experts are biased, which would also be true in
my model under common knowledge of biases. Therefore, my welfare comparison
results in the case of uncertain biases provide mixed support for the superiority of
simultaneous communication. On the one hand, simultaneous communication is
the best for relatively large bias values; on the other hand, sequential and hierar-
chical communication are both better than simultaneous communication for some
relatively small bias values.
Applying the cheap-talk model, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) and Krishna
and Morgan (2001a) compare the efficiency of the legislation process under the
“closed rule” and the “open rule,” when the legislature consults two perfectly in-
formed committees on one piece of legislation.9 Krishna and Morgan (2001a)
show that the open rule can achieve full information revelation while the closed
9The open rule is the same as simultaneous communication in my model, while under the closed
rule the second committee can only influence the legislature’s choice between the first committee’s
proposal and the status quo.
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rule cannot.10 Hori (2006) compares horizontal communication, sequential com-
munication, and delegation in their efficiency at decision making, when each expert
observes a separate piece of information.
The main distinction between my paper and the ones described above is
that I allow biases of the experts to be unknown to the decision maker. Cheap-
talk with uncertainty about a single expert’s bias has been analyzed by Dimitrakas
and Sarafidis (2005), Li and Madarasz (2008), Morgan and Stocken (2003), Morris
(2001), and Ottaviani (2000).
The “hierarchical communication” mechanism I analyze in this model, where
the reviewer decides what the decision maker receives from the expert, is related to
the literature on mediated cheap talk, e.g., papers by Ganguly and Ray (2005), Ivanov
(2009), Mitusch and Strausz (2005), and Goltsman, Horner, Pavlov, and Squintani
(2009). However, the reviewer is equally as informed as the expert, whereas the
mediator is uninformed. In addition, the reviewer’s strategies have to be incentive
compatible, whereas the mediator is disinterested, with the exception of Ivanov’s
model, where the mediator is also potentially biased.
6 APPENDIX: PROOFS
In the following proofs, the reader is sometimes referred to the supplement to the
paper, which can be found at http://alcor.concordia.ca/˜mingli/research/
combsub supp1.pdf, and is available from the author.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since we consider symmetric equilibria, y−1 = −y1 and
y0 = 0. Let y = y1 to save notation. In informative equilibria, y > 0. Since ys
and s have the same sign, we have −(ys− s)2 < −(ys′ − s)2 for all s,s′ ∈ S,s 6= s′.
Therefore, m∗0(s) = s for all s ∈ S.
Now, consider m∗1(s). Note that b1 = b ∈ [17/21,6/7].
First, it is straightforward to see m∗1(1) = 1. Second, m
∗
1(0) = 1, as u(1,0,b) =
−(y−(0+b))2 >−(0−(0+b))2 >−(−y−(0+b))2 for all b> 1/2 and y∈ (0,1].
Finally, m∗1(−1) 6= 1 because b < 1 implies |0− (−1+b)| < |y− (−1+b)|. If
m∗1(−1) =−1 (by symmetry, m∗−1(1) = 1), then y = 3/4. Since b≥ 17/21 > 5/8,
|0− (−1+b)| = 1− b < b− 1/4 = |−y− (−1+b)|, which makes m1(−1) = −1
not optimal. If m∗1(−1) = 0, y = 2/3, thus |0− (−1+b)| = 1− b < b− 1/3 =
|−y− (−1+b)| as b≥ 17/21 > 2/3. Hence, m∗1(−1) = 0 is optimal.
10However, their equilibrium construction has been criticized as relying on arguably implausible
out-of-equilibrium beliefs (Krehbiel, 2001, Battaglini, 2002).
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Table 9: Messages, probabilities, and decisions for simultaneous communication
(mA,mB) Prob(mA,mB,s =−1+0+1) y(mA,mB)
(1,1) 0+ 13 × 13 × 13 + 13 × 23 × 23 45
(1,0) or (0,1) 0+ 13 × 13 × 13 + 13 × 23 × 13 23
(1,−1) 0+ 13 × 13 × 13 +0 0
(0,0) 13 × 13 × 13 + 13 × 13 × 13 + 13 × 13 × 13 0
Thus, the strategy profile specified in the proposition is the unique symmet-
ric equilibrium. Furthermore, the decision maker’s expected utility is −10/27, by
straightforward calculation.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, the following lemma describes the experts’ strategies
in equilibrium.
Lemma 1. When the decision maker consults two experts simultaneously, in equi-
librium, the following must be true about experts’ strategies: for i = A,B, mi0(s) =
mis(s) = s for s =−1 and 1, and mi0(0) = 0.
The proof of it can be found in the supplement. Intuitively, unbiased experts
never try to distort information. A biased expert tells the truth about the state when
the state is at the extreme in the direction of her bias, as by so doing she induces her
favourite action.
In what follows I only show that Strategy Profile (A) is an equilibrium. For
the proof of uniqueness, please see the supplement to the paper.
Table 9 lists probabilities and decisions for each message pair.11 Clearly,
mA1 (0) = 1 is optimal. I need also check the optimality of m
A
1 (−1) = 0. I omit the




x (0)),−1,b1)> 13 ∑x∈X u(y(t,mAx (0)),−1,b1),
which is certainly satisfied since b≥ 17/21> 58/105. Thus mA1 (−1)= 0 is optimal.
Straightforward calculation yields that the decision maker’s expected payoff
is −94/405.
Proof of Proposition 3. I first establish a lemma that describes experts’ equilibrium
strategies, the proof of which can be found in the supplement to the paper.
Lemma 2. When the decision maker consults two experts sequentially, the follow-
ing must be true about experts’ strategies in equilibrium:
11The notation Prob(mA,mB,s = −1 + 0 + 1) means that in that column, probabilities of
(mA,mB,s) are separated by “+” according to different s.
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1. mA0 (1) = m
A
1 (1) = 1 and m
A
0 (0) = 0;
2. mB0 (1,m
A),mB1 (1,m
A) ∈ argmaxmB y(mA,mB);
3. mB0 (0,0)= 0, m
B
1 (0,−1)∈ argmaxmB y(−1,mB), and mB1 (0,0)∈ argmaxmB y(0,mB).
Monotonicity requires that expert A reports 1 in state 1 if she is of type 1.
If she does not, then monotonicity implies mx(s) = 0 for all x ∈ X , which renders
expert A’s messages uninformative. Symmetry requires that the first expert reports
0 in state 0 when she is of type 0. When the true state is 1 and the expert is of type
1 or 0, the expert wants the decision maker to take the highest action. The other
results in the lemma follow from similar lines of argument.
By Lemma 2, the only parts of expert A’s strategy left to be determined are
mA1 (−1) and mA1 (0). Note that in strategy profile (C), mA1 (−1) = 0 and mA1 (0) =
1. Here, I only verify that strategy profile (C) is an equilibrium. Please refer to
the supplement of the paper for a characterization of other monotonic symmetric
equilibria, which shows that (C) is the most informative among those.
Note that in strategy profile (C), y(0,−1) < y(0,0). This immediately im-
plies mB1 (0,0) = 1, m
B
1 (1,0) = 1, and m
B
0 (1,0) = 1. We also know m
B
1 (−1,0) 6= 1
since y(0,0) is better than y(0,1) in state−1 for an expert of type 1. Since y(0,1)≥
2/3, we conclude that mB1 (−1,0) = 0 as a type 1 expert’s most preferred action in
state −1 is −1+ b > −1/3, which is closer to y(0,0) = 0 than to y(0,−1). This
gives us y(0,1) = 2/3.
If y(1,1) = y(1,0), it is possible that (1,1) or (1,0) (but not both) is never
sent, but it does not matter to our discussion since we may replace them with each
other without essentially changing the strategy profile. Now we have y(1,1) >
2/3 > y(1,−1), which implies mB−1(1,1) =−1 and mB−1(0,1) = mB0 (0,1) =−1 as
b ≥ 2/3. Hence y(1,−1) ≤ 1/2, which implies mB1 (0,1) 6= −1 since b ≥ 17/21 >
3/4 and y(1,1) ≤ 1. Thus, y(1,1) = y(1,0) = 4/5 and y(1,−1) = 1/2. The case
y(1,0) = y(1,−1) is similar, which results in y(1,1) = 4/5 and y(1,0) = y(1,−1) =
1/2.
Now, I check the optimality of mA1 (−1) = 0 and mA1 (0) = 1. First, note
that mA1 (−1) = 0 induces actions y(0,−1) =−2/3 with probability 2/3 and y(0,0)
with probability 1/3, that mA1 (−1) = −1 induces actions y(−1,−1) = −4/5 with
probability 2/3 and y(−1,1) = −1/2 with probability 1/3, and that mA1 (−1) = 1
induces action y(1,−1) = 1/2 for sure. Thus, mA1 (−1) = 0 is better than mA1 (−1) =
−1 since a type 1 expert prefers −2/3 to −4/5 and 0 to −1/2 in state −1, due
to our assumption b ∈ [17/21,6/7]. The difference in expected utility between





− (−1+b))2+(0− (−1+b))2]− (1
2
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which is positive given Assmption 1. Thus, mA1 (−1) = 0 is optimal. Second,
mA1 (0) = 1 induces actions y(1,1) = 4/5 with probability 1/3 and y(1,−1) = 1/2
with probability 2/3, while mA1 (0) = 0 induces actions y(0,1) = 2/3, y(0,0) = 0,
and y(0,−1) =−2/3 with equal probabilities. Thus, mA1 (0) = 1 is a better response
than mA1 (0) = 0 since a type 1 expert prefers 4/5 to 2/3 and 1/2 to any nonposi-
tive action, due to our assumption b ∈ [17/21,6/7]. We conclude that the strategy
profile constitutes an equilibrium. Note that it is strategy profile (C), where it is
straightforward to show the decision maker’s expected payoff is −104/405.
Proof of Proposition 4. First, I establish two lemmas regarding the reviewer and
the expert’s equilibrium strategies.
If a reviewer of a certain type rejects a message in some state, then intu-
itively, an expert of the same type should never send that message in the same state,
as there must exist an alternative message that she strictly prefers. The following
lemma establishes this fact.
Lemma 3. In equilibrium, if r∗v(s, t) = 1, then m˜∗v(s, t) = 0, i.e., m∗v(s) 6= t.
Proof. In equilibrium, a reviewer of type v ∈ X rejects message t ∈M in state s ∈ S
if and only if
∑
t ′
−γt ′ [y∗t ′− (s+bv)]2 >− [y∗t − (s+bv)]2 . (2)
Since r∗v(s, t) = 1, Equation (2) must hold. This implies that −[y∗t − (s+ bv)]2 =
u(y∗t ,s,bv) < maxt ′∈S u(y∗t ′,s,bv). Let t˜ = argmaxt ′∈S u(y
∗
t ′,s,bv). Then if an expert
of type v sends the message t˜ in state s, her expected payoff is at least∑t ′ γt ′u(y∗t ′,s,bv),
which is greater than u(y∗t ,s,bv) by Equation (2). Since the expert’s expected payoff
from sending message t is a convex combination of this expression and u(y∗t ,s,bv),
the expert is strictly better off sending message t˜. Hence m˜∗v(s, t) = 0.
Note that symmetry is not needed in the above proof. So, Lemma 3 applies
to all equilibria of the game, not just symmetric ones. Now, I establish that the only
possible behaviour of the reviewer in symmetric equilibria is that in (E2), which
also implies certain behaviour of the expert.
Lemma 4. In a symmetric equilibrium,
1. r∗0(s, t) = 1 if (s, t) = (−1,1),(0,−1),(0,1) or (1,−1), and 0 otherwise;
r∗1(s, t) = 1 if (s, t) = (−1,1),(0,−1) or (1,−1), and 0 otherwise;
2. m0(s) = s for all s ∈ S and m1(1) = 1.
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The proof of the above lemma can be found in the supplement to the paper.
Intuitively, rejection occurs only if the reviewer prefers the resulting random mes-
sage drawn from the endogenous symmetric distribution to the original message.
Because of the quadratic loss utility function, no reviewer prefers the random mes-
sage to the message 0 and rejects the message 0. At the same time, a reviewer of
type 0 rejects messages 1 and −1 in state 0 and message 1 in state −1, since these
messages are the worst for her to pass on to the decision maker. For similar reasons,
a reviewer of type 1 rejects the message −1 when the state is 0 or 1. These argu-
ments do not depend on the size of the bias (as long as b > 1/2, which precludes a
fully revealing equilibrium). However, the argument for type 1 not rejecting −1 in
state−1 and rejecting 1 in state−1 does depend on the fact that her bias is not very
large.
Now we resume the proof of Propsition 4. By Lemmas 3 and 4, m1(−1) 6= 1
and m1(0) 6= −1. What is left to be determined is whether m1(0) = 0 or 1 and
whether m1(−1) = −1 or 0. Observe that since when the decision maker receives
no messages, a message is randomly drawn from the endogenously generated dis-
tribution (γ,1−2γ,γ), the following must be true:
γ = P(s = 1)[P(x = 0,1)+P(x = 1)(1− m˜1(−1,0))]
+P(s = 0)P(x = 1)m˜1(0,1)[P(v = 1)+P(v =−1,0)γ]




































Given the reviewer’s strategies, an expert of type 1 should choose according to the
following comparisons.
(i) Since neither 0 nor −1 is ever rejected in state −1, m1(−1) = 0 if and only if
y1 ≥ 2(1−b).
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(ii) Since in state 0, 0 is not rejected and 1 is rejected by types 0 and−1, m1(0) =




2+b2)]≥ 0 ⇔ y1 ≥
2b(1− 23)
1− 23(1−2γ)
(iii) Using (2), r1(−1,−1) = 0 is optimal if and only if
y1 ≤ 2(1−b)1−2γ .
As fully revealing equilibria do not exist, we consider only three cases: (a) m1(−1)=
0 and m1(0) = 0; (b) m1(−1) = 0 and m1(0) = 1; (c) m1(−1) =−1 and m1(0) = 1.
(a) It can also be represented as m˜1(−1,0) = 1 and m˜1(0,1) = 0.
By (3), we have γ = 2/9, and by (4), we have y1 = (1/3−1/9)/(2/9) = 1.
According to condition (iii) in this proof, we need 1 ≤ 2(1−b)/(5/9). This
requires b≤ 13/18, which is violated given Assumption 1 (b∈ [17/21,6/7]).
(b) This case can be represented by m˜1(−1,0) = 1 and m˜1(0,1) = 1.
By (3), we have γ = 7/23, and by (4), we have y1 = 29/γ .
According to condition (i) in this proof, we need y1 ≥ 2(1−b), which trans-
lates into (1− b− 2/9)(1− 2/3) ≤ 1− 2(1− b)− 2/9. This holds since
b≥ 2(1−b) given Assumption 1.
Using 1−2/3 · (1−2γ) = 9(γ−2/9), condition (ii) becomes 9y1(γ−2/9)≤










which simplifies into b≥ 1721 . By Assumption 1, condition (ii) is satisfied.






This inequality holds when b≤ 6/7, which is satisfied by Assumption 1. So
we conclude that strategy profile (E) is an equilibrium.
(c) This case can be represented by m˜1(−1,0) = 0 and m˜1(0,1) = 1.
By(3), we have γ = 10/23, and by (4), we have y1 = 13/γ .
By condition (i) of this proof, we need y1 ≤ 2(1− b), which requires 1/3 ·
(7/9+2/9 · (1−2/3))≤ (1−b)(2/3+2/9 · (1−2/3)), an impossible state-
ment since 1−b < 1/3. So this is not an equilibrium strategy profile.
The proposition follows from the above arguments.
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